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Jerome Popp’s monograph is a part of the SUNY series in philosophy and biology,
and accordingly is narrowly focused upon discussion of an evolutionary model of
value theory. As Popp explains at the outset, Daniel Dennett—among others—has
proposed that any naturalized moral theory must provide a naturalized account for
its own existence. Popp’s thesis for this work is that, in conjunction with his longoverlooked insight into the significance of Darwin’s thought to the area of epistemology generally, Dewey solved this philosophic problem long ago. This emphasis
upon reconciling Dewey’s work with Dennett’s thought is reiterated in Popp’s conclusion that “It is remarkable how Dewey’s use of evolution in his arguments has
been vindicated by the current thinking in evolutionary theory and by Dennett’s
philosophic arguments” (140). In other words, the major thrust of Popp’s analysis
is toward demonstrating the coherence between the thought of Dennett and other
contemporary evolutionary theorists and that of Dewey.
To establish the scientific background upon which his analysis builds, Popp
devotes chapters 2 through 4 to a review of evolutionary theory generally, including a discussion of the grounding of cognitive theory in understandings of the
evolution of the mind, incorporating the works of Dawkins, Dennett, and others.
This section provides interesting reading and an insightful synthesis of the areas
of evolutionary theory and genetics, ranging from historic sources such as Lama104  E&C/Education & Culture 26 (1) (2010): 104-107
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rck’s thought to recent works in the area of genetics and natural selection, including
works of popular science by Matt Ridley.
As Popp explains in chapter 3, “preparedness versus plasticity,” has generally
replaced the “nature versus nurture” dialectic in the field. Plasticity, the quality of
being able to learn from experience, is a concept that to at least some degree informs the entire discussion that follows. Here, as in many other areas, as Popp demonstrates, Dewey’s understanding of cognition holds up well in conjunction with
more recent developments. Dewey posited “habits” as the outcome of “unlearned
activities,” and accounted for the development of socially constructed meanings as
an overlay to innate tendencies. In short, Dewey understood human growth and
cognitive development as an evolutionary process, even while he lacked the current understanding of DNA.
In chapter 4, Popp continues to develop Dewey’s thought in relation to current theorizing on the evolution of consciousness and human culture, although the
majority of the discussion is still devoted to contemporary works. Popp reviews
Dawkins’s ideas about memes (“catchy” ideas such as tunes, phrases, and fashions
that propagate readily through social contact) and their social function. He then
clarifies that Dewey’s notion of consciousness is active rather than passive—focused
upon the deliberate and purposeful pursuit of some goal. For Dewey, according to
Popp, “philosophy emerged when thinking became conscious of itself, which means
that at some point humans became conscious of their thinking and began to think
about their thinking” (66). This accumulation of cultural content, and especially the
development of language, may, in the current view, explain the need for the relatively
large human brain, along with the emergence of the human mind.
With chapter 5, “Can Evolution Tell Us What to Do?,” Popp begins his analysis
of the implications for human decision making, including how Dewey’s ideas work
in relation to the preceding framework. With regard to the so-called “problem of
the normative” for humankind—the ability, and thus the tendency, to evaluate that
which surrounds us in terms of right and wrong—Popp argues that Dewey solved
this long ago, but that his solution has been overlooked and misunderstood. Dewey’s
position, per Popp, is that the only standard for judging the “goodness” of growth
for the human mind is in its capacity for continued growth.
At this point, Popp reintroduces what I view as his secondary—and from my
educational perspective, potentially more compelling—thesis: that Dewey’s Darwinian perspective has been widely misunderstood in relation to democracy. This idea
is first raised in the introduction; the tendency to give the concept of democracy
primacy as an independent good in understanding Dewey is, in Popp’s words, “a
debilitating mistake.” He continues: “To ignore the Darwinian nature of Dewey’s
arguments is to get the impression that it is his basic purpose to articulate and justify
a conception of democracy as morality”(xi). In fact, says Popp, “Dewey’s analysis of
democracy is an attempt to enucleate the social conditions that best open the way
for intellectual growth . . . thus, democracy is subordinated to growth, which means
that the value of democracy is derivative” (85). In other words, democracy is the
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means, and intelligence the end. Disappointingly, however, the results or implications of this miscasting of Dewey’s thought are not demonstrated or discussed.
The means-ends mode of analysis is carried into the following section regarding situational ethics, still a part of the jam-packed chapter 5. Popp notes that Dewey
has been accused of advocating a form of situational ethics, then continues:
[T]he counterargument is that situational ethics ignores evolution, because each situation in which we find ourselves is not unique unto itself.
One situation grows out of another. Both history and the future, as far as
we can know either, form elements of the ‘situation’ that is the context of
the moral judgment” (89-90).

This perspective, focused upon the species rather than the individual or group of
individuals, is also seen in his comment some pages earlier: “Most of the ethics literature is focused on the individual and not the species, but evolution is about species
more than it is about individuals” (79). The groundwork for this line of argument is
laid much earlier in the book, when Popp reminds the reader that natural selection
takes place on a species level, rather than an individual one. Popp further argues
that Dewey advocates for each situation to be evaluated not only as an end, but as a
means to further ends. While this has been criticized as an infinitely regressive approach to valuation, Popp believes that this ignores Dewey’s Darwinian grounding;
regression is halted by evaluating the course of action in light of the consequences
for continued intellectual development for individuals in conjunction to the development of the species as a whole—Dewey’s real supreme good.
I find this portion of the discussion unsatisfying due to what seems to me to be
a too ready dismissal of the complexities of particularity. Dewey himself articulated
his focus on particularity in a variety of ways and over many years, in comments
ranging from, “Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins and absolute
finalities in order to explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate them” (MW 10: 43), to “Attainment of the relatively secure and settled takes
place, however, only with respect to specified problematic situations; quest for certainty that is universal, applying to everything, is a compensatory perversion” (LW
4: 182). The rejection of value judgments that go beyond a specific and immediate
setting permeates every level of Dewey’s thought, and Popp’s apparent argument
that situational ethics can be evaded through instrumental evaluation carried out
at a species level and thus across time and space seems to me to not robustly engage
Dewey upon this point.
Dewey’s perspective on diversity is considered in relation to the need for innovation in chapter 6, “Democracy and The Baldwin Effect.” Here, Popp furthers the
case for plasticity, since complex society leads to emergent dilemmas and the need
for novel problem solving. This requires that democracy exist as more than just a
majority-rules system of government, but as one “whose sociopolitical organizations
are such that they actively promote intellectual growth for all of their members and
create the social conditions that support the greater use of intelligence in the formaE&C  Education and Culture
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tion and solution of problems encountered” (102). In something of a passing note,
Popp proposes that this vision requires a media and a social system of association
that promote interaction with diverse perspectives, the intent of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Again, this is a compelling line of discussion for the
educator, but remains largely outside the focus of this work.
Popp’s final chapter is devoted to an analysis of how Dewey’s liberalism differs
from earlier, pre-evolutionary forms. One section, “Why Nondemocratic Schools
are Miseducative,” sets out the explanation of Dewey’s preoccupation with education as the vital ingredient in his end goal of continued intellectual growth: “He sees
educational institutions as social structures aimed at the development of intelligence
. . . and the role of any teacher or parent is to give direction to these [pre-existing]
tendencies while adhering to the principles of the ethical way of coming at life” (129).
Popp then turns to the attacks made on Dewey for thus undermining the principles
of a classical liberal education, à la Jefferson. Here, as in previous chapters, excerpts
from, and discussion of, authors other than Dewey are extended, while Dewey’s own
thought is characterized briefly, rather than developed at length.
This work provides a systematic evaluation of Dewey’s evolutionary thinking that will be of great interest to those working in the history and philosophy of
science, and especially in value theory. For educational philosophers, as well as for
educational practitioners, there are suggestions for lines of inquiry into a range of
contemporary issues; however, given the focus of this work these remain less developed. Ultimately, also, I was left still wishing for an assessment of what Dewey
might offer that remains unaddressed by contemporary theorists such as Dawkins,
Dennett, and others.
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